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Apportionment of Extraordinary Dividends
Between Life Tenant and Remainderman
All courts are agreed that the basic principle governing the
distribution of trust receipts between a life beneficiary and a re-
mainderman is that the intention of the settlor shall be given ef-
fect unless it is contrary to law.' In the usual case, where the set-
tior has directed that the income or earnings be paid to a bene-
ficiary for life, with a remainder over, this means that ordinary
cash dividends, declared on stock held by the trust are awarded
to income, that is, to the life beneficiary, if they are declared out
of corporate earnings and while the stock is subject to the life in-
ter6st. If, however, such a dividend is declared before or after the
existence of the life interest it is allocated to corpus, that is, to
the remainderman; as is a dividend declared out of capital, regard-
less of the time of its declaration. 2 While there have been few
cases on the subject, it is generally believed that the same rules
apply to ordinary stock dividends, although some jurisdictions re-
fuse to differentiate between ordinary and extraordinary stock divi-
dends, but treat all stock dividends as extraordinary, or at least
award all such dividends to corpus.3 Under these rules governing
the distribution of ordinary dividends the time relative to the com-
mencement of the life interest during which the surplus out of which
the dividend was earned is immaterial. If the dividend was declared
during the life interest it is awarded to income in its entirety; if
it was declared prior to the commencement of, or after the termi-
nation of the life interest, it goes, in its entirety, to corpus.4 The
sole exception to this rule against apportionment is New Jersey,
which in this respect treats ordinary dividends the same as extra-
ordinary dividends.s
1 In re Anson's Settlement, [1907] 2 Ch. 424; Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U.S.
594 (1890); Hubley v. Wolfe, 329 Ky. 574, 82 S.W. 2d 830 (1935); Gray v.
Hemenway, 268 Mass. 515, 168 N.E. 102 (1929); In re Osborne, 209 N. Y. 450,
103 N.E. 723 (1913); In re Crozers Estate, 336 Pa. 266, 9 A. 2d 535 (1939). Effect
was not given the settlor's intention in In re Megrue, 224 N.Y. 284, 120 N.E. 651
(1918); In re Mars Estate, 301 Pa. 20, 151 Ati. 577 (1930); where to do so
would have violated a statute against accumulations.
2 In re Marjoribanks, [1923] 2 Ch. 307; Harding v. Staples, 111 Conn. 325,
149 Atl. 846 (1930); Robinson v. Robinson's Ex'r., 221 Ky. 245, 298 S.W. 701
(1927); Anderson v. Bean, 272 Mass. 432, 172 N.E. 647 (1930); In re Osborne,
supra note 1; Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857).
.1 RESTATEMENT, TRusTs, § 236, comment h; Cf. In re Billard, 147 Misc. 472
(Sur. Ct. 1933). For the view that all stock dividends are extraordinary, see
Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Tucker, 52 RI. 277, 160 AtL 465 (1932).
4 In re Osborne, supra note 1; Earp's Appeal, supra note 2.
5 Lang v. Lang, 57 N.J. Eq. 325, 41 Atl. 705 (1899); Hagedorn v. Arens,
106 N.J. Eq. 377, 150 AtI. 4 (1930).
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In comparison with this relatively well settled state of the law
regarding ordinary dividends, there is an irreconcilable conflict
among the cases in regard to extraordinary dividends. The con-
trolling factor is still, theoretically at least, the intention of the set-
tlor, but in most cases the settlor has not manifested any inten-
tion other than to say that "income," "earnings" or "dividends"
and the like are to go to the life beneficiary. Since the problem is
determining whether an extraordinary dividend is income, such
general manifestations of interest on the settlor's part can afford
no guide to the court in distributing the extraordinary dividend.'
As a matter of fact the problem probably never even occurred to
the settlor. A few cases have held that the court should look into
the surrounding circumstances of each case and from them infer
some intention on the part of the settlor, but by far the majority
of the cases have been decided by resort to some definite rule of
law. For example, in Wiiberding v. Miller7 the Ohio Supreme Court
said, ".... there should be no arbitrary, rigid rule which would pre-
vent the court from looking into the facts and circumstances of
each case to determine the rights of the parties according to justice
and equity." This case was, however, overruled by Lamb v. Lah-
mann,s in which the court said,
There is something attractive and appealing about a prop-
osition to avoid an arbitrary rigid rule and decide contro-
versies according to justice and equity, but it is more im-
portant and satisfying to establish general rules whereby
all causes can be decided with measurable uniformity.
As a result in the application of these general rules the facts of
any particular case are unimportant except as they might cause
the court to modify or change the rule it had previously adopted,
or to indulge in a more diligent search for some manifestation of the
settlor's intention in order to avoid what appears to be a harsh re-
sult.9
In England there were developed two rules for the distribui-
tion of extraordinary dividends, the so-called early and later Eng-
lish rules. Under the early English rule all extraordinary dividends
were given to corpus.10 There were many departures from this rule,
however, and in Bouch v. Sproule" it was limited to corporations
which do not have the power to increase their capital, and the later
English rule was established. Under this rule the dividend is in-
come if the corporation intended a distribution of earnings, and cor-
6 In re Heaton, 89 Vt. 550, 96 AtI. 21 (1916).
7 88 Ohio St. 609, 100 N.E. 665 (1913).
8 110 Ohio St. 59, 143 N.E. 276 (1924).
9 In re Osborne, supra note 1.
10 Brander v. Brander, 4 Ves. 800, 31 Eng. Reprint 414 (1799); Irving v.
Houston, 4 Paton (Scot.) 521 (1803).
1112 App. Cas. 385 (1887).
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pus if the corporation intended to capitalize the earnings. Thus, the
intention of the corporation is the controlling factor, although the
courts will look through the form of the corporate act to ascertain
its true substance. The rule was stated as follows:
When a testator or settlor directs or permits the subject of
his disposition to remain as shares or stocks in a company
which has the power either of distributing its profits as a
dividend, or converting them into capital, and the company
validly exercised this power, such exercise of its power is
binding on all persons interested under the testator or set-
tlor in the shares; and consequently what is paid by the
company as dividend goes to the tenant for life, and what is
paid by the company to the shareholder as capital, or ap-
propriated as an increase in the capital stock of the con-
cern, inures to the benefit of all who are interested in the
capital.12
There is, under this rule, as under the general rules relating to
ordinary dividends, no apportionment of the dividend.
In the United States there have developed three principal rules;
the Massachusetts rule, the Pennsylvania rule, sometimes called the
American rule, and the Kentucky rule, formerly known as the New
York and Kentucky rule. Of these three rules only the Massa-
chusetts and Pennsylvania rules have received widespread support.
The Massachusetts rule closely resembles the English rule in that it
gives all cash dividends to income and all stock dividends to corpus,
without differentiating between ordinary and extraordinary divi-
dends. 12 Under this rule the character of the dividend is the control-
ling factor, as under the English rule, and there is no apportion-
ment of the dividend. While the expressed purpose of the corpor-
ation is persuasive, the courts applying this rule will look behind
such expressions to ascertain the real purpose or intention of the
corporation, as is done by the English courts.14 The critical determi-
nations which must be made by a court or trustee in order to apply
the rule are, first, that the dividend represents earnings, not capital;
second, that it was declared during the life interest; and third, its
substantial character as a stock or cash dividend. In Minot v.
Paine,5 the leading Massachusetts case applying the rule, the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court said, "A simple rule is to regard divi-
dends, however large, as income, and stock dividends, however
made, as capital."
The Pennsylvania rule stands out in sharp contrast to the Mas-
sachusetts and English rules. Under this rule an extraordinary divi-
12 Bouch v. Sproule, supra note 11.
13 Gibbons v. Mahon, supra note 1; Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 108 (1868).
14 Harding v. Staples, supra note 2; Talbot v. Milliken, 221 Mass. 367, 108
N. 1060 (1915).
Is Supra note 13.
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dend of either stock or cash is awarded to income or corpus, or ap-
portioned between them, depending on the time, relative to the
existence of the life interest, during which the surplus out of which
the dividend was declared was earned and the effect which the dec-
laration of the dividend has on the value of the corpus. The source
of the dividend is the controlling factor. If the dividend was de-
clared out of surplus accumulated prior to the commencement of
the life interest it is awarded entirely to corpus, while if it was
declared out of surplus earned after the commencement of the life
interest it is given to income. If, however, the surplus out of which
it was declared was earned both before and during the existence
of the life interest the dividend is apportioned between income and
corpus.16 The method of apportionment followed in most states
which have adopted the rule is to allocate so much of the dividend
to corpus as is required to make the intrinsic value of the corpus
after the declaration of the dividend equal to its value as of the date
of the commencement of the life interest, with adjustments for capi-
tal gains or loses.17
The effect of the rule is to give to the life tenant the in-
come which has been earned since the trust came into be-
ing, but, at the same time, to preserve the value of the cor-
pus as it was at the date of the death of the testator, or, to
use a more convenient term, to preserve the intact value
of the estate.... An extraordinary dividend paid out of ac-
cumlated earnings presumptively belongs to the life tenant,
but if it be shown that the distribution impairs the intact
value of the estate the court will make an apportionment.18
The courts of New Jersey, however, in their application of the
Pennsylvania rule use a different basis of apportionment. Under
their approach the dividend is apportioned so that the ratio of that
part of the dividend allocated to corpus to that part allocated to
income equals the ratio of that part of the surplus earned prior to
the commencement of the life interest to that part earned after such
time.19 In order to apply the Pennsylvania rule the court or trustee
must determine, first, that the dividend was declared out of earn-
ings; and, second, the time, in relation to the life interest, when
the surplus out of which the dividend was declared was earned,
and the effect of the dividend on the value of the corpus, or, in
New Jersey, the exact ratio between the surplus earned prior to,
and after, the commencement of the life interest.
16 Thomas v. Gregg, 78 Md. 545, 28 Atl. 565 (1894); Earp's Appeal, supra
note 2; In re Boyle, 235 Wis. 282, 293 N.W. 150 (1840).
17 See cases supra note 16; In re Barnes Estate, 338 Pa. 555, 12 A. 2d 912
(1940).
18 In re Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 Al. 200 (1927).
19 Lang v. Lang, supra note 5; Ballantine v. Young, 79 N.J. Eq. 70, 81 Ati.
119 (1911).
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'What is sometimes called the Rhode Island rule is in reality
a combination of the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania rules. The
Rhode Island Supreme Court said, in Rhode Island Hospital Trust
Co. v. Tucker: 20
The Massachusetts rule, so far as so-called stock dividends
are concerned, appears to be logical, to be founded on cor-
rect legal principles, and to be a rule by which justice may
be done between the life tenant and the remainderman.
However, it may be pertinent to say that we cannot follow
the Massachusetts rule in its application to extraordinary
cash dividends the payment of which impairs the surplus
accumulated before the creation of the trust.
The third major rule developed in this country is the Ken-
tucky rule. This rule states that all extraordinary dividends de-
clared out of earnings are income.21 The only requirement is that
they be declared during the existence of the life interest. Thus,
the character and the source of the dividend are immaterial, the
time of its declaration is the only criterion. In Hite v. Hite22 the
court said:
Where a dividend, although declared in stock, is based up-
on the earnings of the company, it is in reality, whether
called by one name or another, the income of the capital
invested in it... a singular state of case-it seems to us,
an unreasonable one-is presented if the company, al-
though it rests with it whether it will declare a dividend,
can bind the courts as to the proper ownership of it, and by
the mode of payment substitute its will for that of the testa-
tor, and favor the life tenants over the remaindermen, as it
may desire.
In spite of the differences in principle among the Massachu-
setts, Pennsylvania and Kentucky rules, their application does not
always produce different results. An extraordinary cash dividend
declared during the life interest out of earnings accumulated dur-
"ag that interest would be given to income by all three rules. Such
a dividend representing earnings accumulated before the commence-
ment of the life interest would be awarded to income by both the
Massachusetts and Kentucky rules and to corpus by the Pennsyl-
vania rule. If the surplus were earned partly before and partly
after the commencement of the life interest, the dividend would,
as above, be given to income by the Massachusetts and Kentucky
rules, but would be apportioned under the Pennsylvania rule. In
the case of an extraordinary stock dividend which is both declared
and earned during the life interest, the dividend would be allocated
to income by the Pennsylvania and Kentucky rules, but would be
20 Suprz note 3.
21 Hite v. Hite, 93 Ky. 257, 20 S.W. 778 (1892); Hubley v. Wolfe, supra
note 1.22 Supra note 21.
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considered corpus under the Massachusetts rule. Such a dividend
earned before the commencement of the life interest would be al-
located to corpus by the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania rule, but
would be income under the Kentucky rule. If the surplus were
accumulated both before and during the commencement of the life
interest it would be considered income under the Kentucky rule,
corpus under the Massachusetts rule, and would be apportioned
under the Pennsylvania rule.
It is difficult to compare these three rules. As Scott points
out "... the reasons in favor of one are not such as can be easily
balanced against each other."23 In general, the arguments have been
of two types, those based on practicality and those based on legal
principle. The proponents of the Massachusetts rule are quick to
compare its relative simplicity with the complications which may
attend the application of the Pennsylvania rule. In discussing the
Massachusetts rule the Supreme Court of Illinois said:
The doctrine is based upon the impracticability of deter-
mining the comparative rights of different persons in a par-
ticular share of stock, of going behind the votes of the cor-
poration and its directors, and of investigating the corporate
accounts and affairs in order to ascertain how the corpora-
tion acquired the fund out of which the dividend was de-
clared. 24
The same thought was expressed in Minot v. Paine: 25
A trustee needs one plain principle to guide him; and the
cestuis que trust ought not to be subjected to the expense
of going behind the action of the directors, and investigating
the concerns of the corporation...."
In this respect those courts which are committed to the Pennsyl-
vania rule have characterized the other rules, especially the Mas-
sachustetts rule as being one of expediency.
[The other rules] are clearly arbitrary, and adopted for the
convenience of the trustees in the discharge of their duties
and the courts who instruct them in their duties. 26
Without doubt the Massachusetts rule is the easier of the two to
apply, although both rules require the fact that the dividend was
declared out of earnings be established, and under the Massachu-
setts rule the affairs of the corporation may have to be inquired
into in order to determine the true character of the dividend. To
say, as some have, that the Pennsylvania rule is so complicated
that it is impossible to apply, or that it can never produce the fair
result in practice that it does in theory seems to be going a bit too
far. It is difficult to apply the rule in some cases, but for the most
23 ScoTT, TRusTs § 857, 834.
24 Whiting v. Hagey, 336 IlM. 86, 7 N.E. 885 (1937).
2 S Supra note 13.
26 Beattie v. Gedney, 99 N.J. Eq. 207, 132 AtI. 652 (1926). See also In re
Nirdlinger's Estate, supra note 18.
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part it does seem to achieve its objectives, albeit with some diffi-
culty and expense that would be avoided under the Massachusetts
or Kentucky rules.
Concerning the logic behind the Massachusetts rule, its sup-
porters take the position that a stock dividend is not a true divi-
dend, and that therefore the life beneficiary can have no claim to it.
The theory is that in the case of cash and property divi-
dends, there is an actual severance of the subject of the
dividend from the corporate assets, whereas stock dividends
involve only readjustments of the corporate structure, the
corporate assets remaining the property of the corporation
as fully as they were before. 7
Further, the distribution of stock dividends to the life beneficiary
reduces the voting power of the corpus, although control over cor-
porate affairs is probably not a factor in many cases. In this re-
gard, the supporters of the Pennsylvania rule point out that many
other factors, beyond the control of the trustee or the courts, may
also reduce the proportionate interest held by the trustee. They
also claim that as a general rule the settlor is more likely to favor
the life beneficiary than the remainderman. This, however, seems
too problematical to be a valid legal argument. The basic objec-
tion to allocating stock dividends entirely to corpus is that such a
rule may, if the corporation declares most of its dividends in this
form, deprive the life beneficiary of any substantial income from
the trust. It is contended that such a result is both unfair and con-
trary to the intention of the settlor. It must be admitted that the
Massachusetts rule does, in some cases, seem to produce a harsh
result. With regard to any argument based on the settlor's inten-
tion it must be remembered that these rules apply only in cases
where the settlor has not manifested any particular intention. The
most that can be said is that the court assumes that it would have
been contrary to the settlor's intention; at best this is a not too
reliable argument. It has also been claimed that the Massachusetts
rule places the intention of the corporation over that of the settlor.
This also is a faulty argument. Where the rule is to be applied
there is no intention of the settlor to be displaced because he has
manifested no intention.
In most discussions of these rules it is said that, aside from
the foregoing argument in regard to stock dividends, there is no
justification in principle for the Massachusetts rule, but that it rests
solely on expediency and the complications which may occur in
the application of the Pennsylvania rule.2 8 This does not seem too
sound. As the Missouri Supreme Court said:
The converse of that ruling (that all stock dividends are
27 Hayes v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 317 Mo. 1028, 298 S.W. 91 (1927).
28 SCoTT, ThusTs § 236.4; 130 A.L.R. 492, 532.
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corpus) would be that money or property which is severed
from corporate assets by appropriate action of the govern-
ing body of the corporation and paid as dividends, would
be income .... 29
Rhode Island, however, has accepted the Massachusetts rule as re-
gards stock dividends and rejected it in favor of the Pennsylvania
rule in the case of cash dividends.30 The logic of this position seems
questionable. If severance from corporate assets of the subject of
the dividend is the criterion, it ought to be applied to both stock
and cash dividends. In England this has been done and has been
stated as the basis for the later English rule. It seems to also be
the basis for the Massachusetts rule, but the courts following that
rule have not enunciated it as a general principle. They have reached
the same practical result and they have used the argument in re-
lation to stock dividends, but they have somehow neglected, for
the most part, to recognize it as the general basis for the rule and
to apply the same reasoning to cash dividends.
In view of the slight support it has received, there would seem
to be little reason for discussing the Kentucky rule at length. It
is criticized by the adherents of the Pennsylvania rule for allocating
all dividends to income, no matter when the surplus out of which
they were declared was earned, and by the followers of the Massa-
chusetts rule for giving stock dividends to income. Even the courts
of Kentucky do not seem overly fond of the rule. In Laurent v.
Randolph3' the court of appeals said:
The writer of this opinion is enclined to favor the Pennsyl-
vania rule as the fairest and most equitable rule of dis-
tribution between life tenant and remainderman. However,
under the facts of the instant case the life tenant would be
entitled to the distribution under any of the three rules
mentioned above, and there is no reason for departing from
the precedent now accepted as the settled law of this state.
The relative strength of the various rules, in terms of the num-
ber of jurisdictions supporting them has always been in a state of
flux as states previously committed to one rule change to another
or new jurisdictions adopt a rule for the first time. New York is
an excellent example of how a state may change rules. Orignally
it followed the Kentucky rule.32 In the famous case of In re Os-
borne33 the Pennsylvania rule was adopted, partly from considera-
tions of principle and partly in order to avoid what the court con-
sidered a harsh result, which would have obtained under the Ken-
tucky rule. Then, in 1926, the Legislature enacted the substance of
29 Hayes v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., supra note 27.
30 Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Tucker, supra note 3.
31306 Ky. 134, 206 S.W. 2d 480 (1947).
32 In re Kernochan, 104 N.Y. 618, 11 N.E. 149 (1887); McTouth v. Hunt, 154
N.Y. 179, 48 N.E. 548 (1897).
3 3 Supra note 1.
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the Massachusetts rule into law in regard to stock dividends.34 There
is also no clear cut unanimity of opinion among the text writers on
the subject. Mr. Scott states that the Pennsylvania rule is more
just, and generally seems to prefer it, although he admits that the
Massachusetts rule is preferable on the ground of simplicity.3s M'fr.
Bogert, on the other hand, takes the position that, while the objects
of the Pennsylvania rule are "praiseworthy," its attendant compli-
cations "are such that there can be no assurance of even substantial
realization of this ideal," and therefore prefers the Massachusetts
rule in the final analysis.3 6
Beginning in the 1920's, however, there has been a definite
trend favoring the Massachusetts rule, both judicially and on the
part of various state legislatures. Prior to that time approximately
thirteen jurisdictions supported or favored the Pennsylvania rule,37
two states apparently supported the Kentucky rule,38 one adopted
both the Pennsylvania and Kentucky rules in part,39 and one had
rejected the Massachusetts rule without distinguishing between the
Pennsylvania and Kentucky rules. 40 Eight jurisdictions followed the
Massachusetts rule.4' At the present time, by contrast, twenty-six
jurisdictions have adopted, or favor, the Massachusetts rule,42 eight
the Pennsylvania rule,43 and two have adopted both rules in part,4
the rest of the distribution remaining unchanged. The only signi-
ficant event running contrary to this general trend in favor of the
Massachusetts rule was the adoption, in 1935, of the Pennsylvania
rule by the Restatement of Trusts.4S
The legislative trend toward the Massachusetts rule has been
due, for the most part, to the adoption of that rule by the Uniform
Principal and Income Act, which has now been adopted in fourteen
34 N. Y. PEas. PRoP. LAw § 17-a.
3s Scowr, TausTs § 236.3
3 6 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUsTEEs § 857.
37 California, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Wisconsin
and Hawaii.
3 8 Delaware and Kentucky.
39 Rhode Island.4o Vermont.
41 Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, North Carolina,
West Virginia and the United States courts.4 2 Alabama, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregan, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and the United States courts.
43 Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Tennessee
and Wisconsin.
44 New York and Rhode Island.
4 S RSTATEmENT, TRusTs § 236 (b).
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states. 46 The reason for this choice of rules is stated in the Com-
missioners Prefatory Note:
The aim followed in this act is that of as simple and conven-
ient administration of the estate as is consistent with fair-
ness to all beneficiaries. It is felt, too, that workable rules
are after all nearest the settlor's probable intent, for he
has not probably contemplated extensive and detailed book-
keeping adjustments of the property he has destined for his
donees. When the first draft of the act was presented, the
Conference voted to follow the so-called Massachusetts rule
... Experience has shown that, however praiseworthy the
intent, the later rule (Pennsylvania) is unworkable, since
neither trustee nor court has the means to value the cor-
porate assets in such a way as to secure the fair adjustment
aimed at.
Of the states that have adopted this Act, three had previously ad-
hered to the Pennsylvania rule, namely California, Maryland, and
Pennsylvania itself. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, although
it refused to apply the act retroactively, conceded that its adop-
tion "may have been a wise and even desirable legislative enact-
ment."47 The only other statutory change was the adoption of the
Massachusetts rule in New York as regards stock dividends. Com-
menting on this change, Cardozo, J., said:
The rule previously applied had resulted in so many com-
plications and obscurities as to be almost unworkable in
practice. . . .The Legislature evinced its will that there
should be an end to these complexities in the administra-
tion of the law of trusts.48
There has been no case of a state, which had previously adopted
another rule, changing the rule by judicial decision. South Carolina,
which had previously indicated a preference for the Pennsylvania
rule, now seems to favor the Massachusetts rule; indications by
way of dicta are all the supreme court of that state has given,
however. 49 Several states have adopted a rule for the first time,
however, and all have supported the Massachusetts rule. These
are, in the order in which they adopted the rule, Ohio, Missouri,
Michigan, Nebraska, Indiana, Alabama and South Dakota. The rea-
son most often given was that "a stock dividend is not in any true
sense a dividend at all.so Most of the opinions also were, in the
46Alabama, California, Connecticut, Florida, Illnois, Louisiana, Maryland,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah and Virginia.47 In re Crawford's Estate, 362 Pa. 458, 67 A. 2d 124 (1949).
48 People ex rel. Clark v. Gilchrist, 243 N.Y. 473, 153 N.E. 39 (1926).
49 Cobb v. Fant, 36 S.C. 1, 14 S.E. 959 (1892); Wallace v. Wallace, 90 S.C.
61, 72 SM. 553 (1911); Gist v. Craig, 142 S.C. 407, 141 S.E. 126 (1927).
SO Lamb v. Lehmann, 110 Ohio St., 143 N.E. 276 (1924); Hayes v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co. 317 Mo. 1028, 298 S.W. 91 (1927); In re Estate of Joy, 247 Mich.
418, 225 N.W. 878 (1929);. United States Trust Co. v. Cowin, 121 Neb. 427, 237
N.W. 284 (1931); Powell v. Madison Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 208 Ind. 432,
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language of the Michigan Supreme Court, "somewhat influenced
by the practical difficulties... which have been met with in apply-
ing a rule which provides for apportionment."5' One case pointed
out that "the inherent fallacy of the Pennsylvania rule is that it
regards the corpus of the trust as of its value at the time the trust
was created, while the fact is . . . the stock, itself, is the corpus,
and it may rise or fall in value."52
It was also said in several of the opinions that the actions of
the corporation, in the absence of any contrary intention on the
part of the settlor, must be considered as binding.
Even in the light of these recent cases it is difficult to evaluate
the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania rules on a logical basis. They
seem, in fact, to be the result of two fundamentally different ap-
proaches to the problem. The Pennsylvania rule treats the corpus
of the estate as having a certain intrinsic value as of the time it be-
came subject to the life interest. This value is then protected and
any increments to the stock which do not deplete this value and are
declared out of corporate earnings are considered income to the
trust, either because it is assumed that this is the fair way to dis-
tribute such increments, or because it is assumed that such was
the probable intention of the settlor. On the other hand, the Massa-
chusetts and English rules proceed to ascertain, in the absence of the
manifestation of any specific declaration by the settlor, what is in-
come and what is corpus. The criterion used is the action of the
corporation; the question is, did the corporation distribute this divi-
dend as income or as an increment to the corpus of the trust?
Rather than try to figure out what is fair, or what the settlor might
have intended, this view starts with the settlor's direction that the
"income" to the trust be given the life beneficiary and then pro-
ceeds to define income in terms of traditional legal concepts. If this
approach needs any justification other than that it is the only way
to handle the problem without injecting extrinsic matters into the
situation, it can be assumed that the settlor knew the beneficiaries
would be, and intended that they should be bound by the acts of
the corporation since that is one of the inherent qualities of stock
ownership.
Both rules are logical. The Massachusetts rule seems more in
keeping with traditional legal thought, it is more analytically cor-
rect perhaps, but it is also perhaps not quite as fair in the distribu-
tion it will require. If these were the only factors to be considered,
196 N.E. 324 (1935); First National Bank of Tuskaloosa v. Hill, 241 Ala. 606, 4
So. 2d 170 (1940); Kirby v. Western Surety Co., 70 S.D. 483, 5 N.W. 2d 405
(1942).
51 In re Estate of Joy, supra note 50.
52 United States Trust Co. v. Cowin, supra note 50.
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the Pennsylvania rule would appear to be preferable. There is,
however, also the practical matter of applicability. While the dif-
ficulties to be encountered by the courts in the application of the
rule may not be sufficient to justify preferring the Massachusetts
rule in its place, the fact that it forces trustees to decide between
expending considerable time and money in an attempt to investi-
gate the affairs of a corporation or run the risk of incurring per-
sonal liability for a maldistribution of trust receipts would seem to
weight the scales in favor of the Massachusetts rule. This indeed
has been the trend in recent times.
The fact that any rule adopted will yield before a manifesta-
tion of the settlor's intention in respect to the matter would seem to
provide both another reason for preferring the Massachusetts rule
and what is perhaps the only really satisfactory solution to the prob-
lem. So long as this is the case any unfairness which may be found
in any rule can be avoided if the settlor will specify exactly what
he wants done with extraordinary dividends. The Massachusetts
rule "forces settlors who desire to adjust matters in a different way
to declare their intents in detail. In most large trusts operating
under the rule the trustee is given discretion; or specific instruc-
tions are set forth which insure that no substantial injustice will
be done to either interest under the trust."53 Thus, in the final
analysis, draftsmanship can provide the only real answer to such
a question as this. Regardless of the logic behind rules, there is,
and probably will continue to be, a split of authority. The only way
for a settlor to be certain extraordinary dividends will be distri-
buted according to his wishes is to give the matter some thought
and then make definite provisions in the will or trust instrument
concerning the matter.
Charies D. Shook
53 BoGRT, TausTs AND TRUsTEES § 857.
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